

To: 110

From: Leslie ~~SECRET~~

Date: 17.4.45

SECRET

CONCLUSIONS.

April 17-1945

1. I believe that in their different ways both H. and W. are important contacts, well worth developing.

H. is, of course, dangerous. He is a Nazi and an admitted associate of such men as Glaise-Horstenau and Meindl. He is a fanatical anti-Russian and, for this reason, we can not very well collaborate with him - at least not without informing the Russians. But I see no reason why we should not use him in the furtherance of interests common both to the United Nations and to him and his associates, namely, the hastening of the end of resistance in Austria by the disruption of the R duit. I feel that we should make full use of the Nachrichten-dienst which he is organizing, of the propaganda services which he is setting up, and of the material which he can supply for this propaganda. I fully concur with him that psychological warfare must play a tremendously important r le in combatting the R duit. Further, I feel that we should encourage him in his attempts to create opposition groups within the R duit. Although it is impossible to have any real sympathy for a man of his type, he nevertheless made a favourable impression on me. I believe he is sincere and to be trusted, provided we give him a certain measure of confidence. There is considerable evidence of his good will in his rescuing of such men as Seitz and Messner, and in his bringing out a man like W. There is also W.'s opinion of him, and G.'s trust of him as reported by W.

To avoid any accusation that we are working with a Nazi reactionary and a fanatical anti-Russian, I believe that we should keep our contact with him as indirect as possible. A., L., and possibly Grimm should be the people to deal with him, if and when he comes out again (and he expects to do so very shortly). I might possibly see him again but not alone and only in the capacity of an interested observer at his discussions with A. and Co. In such a capacity, I can always give him the encouragement he seeks without committing us in any way to any direct form of collaboration.

In this connection, it is amusing that H. told me that upon his return to Germany, he would have to show his Nazi masters something for his visit here. He stated that he would like to say that he had managed to obtain contacts with the Americans and had discovered from them that their divergencies with the Russians were very real. I told him that if he made any such reports, there was no question of my ever seeing him again, nor I imagine, of any collaboration with the Austrian group here. A., who was present, fully confirmed this. H. then asked me if I could provide him with any material to pass on his Nazi masters - something less harmful, such as reports of difficulties we were having with

To: 110
From: Leslie
Date: 17.4.45

SECRET

the German

DECLASSIFIED AND RELEASED BY
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
SOURCES METHODS EXEMPTION 3B2D
NAZI WAR CRIMES DISCLOSURE ACT
DATE 2000 2006

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

the German population in occupied Germany. As a matter of amusement, I asked him why he did not go back and report the truth, to which he answered that his Nazi masters were only concerned to receive information which pleased them. This question of supplying him with material for his Nazi masters should, I feel, be further discussed.

Interesting is the fact that H. never hinted to me that he wanted any return from us for his services. I think, however, he takes it for granted that we will take into account his present services when judging his past activities. Furthermore, I believe that he hopes that he and his associates will be able to play a political rôle in the future Austria as a result of his present activities. To make our position clear on these points, I told him that no man need fear for his security, provided he was not guilty of any war crime, and further, that the future of any political group in Austria depended not on us, but on the Austrian people. He seemed quite satisfied with this.

Both A. and Grimm confirmed my own impression that H. is a sincere man whom we can most usefully use, but with whom we should in no way collaborate. He also made a favourable impression on Pater Schmidt.

2. W. is an entirely different person. I am convinced that he has always been a violent anti-Nazi and that he and his associates have done their "Austrian best" to fight Nazism. The people he represents are somewhat reactionary and his strong anti-Russian feelings are embarrassing. However, he strikes me as important, being our first really sound contact with what is an obviously important political grouping in Austria. His plans for the political future of his country strike me as sound, and I believe that he too can help in the internal disruption of the Réduit. The impression he made on me was altogether favourable, and I see numerous ways in which we can use him, such as obtaining from him reports on political trends inside Austria, white and black lists, advice in various Austrian questions. I strongly advise further talks with him during his stay in Switzerland, and I, myself, plan to see him again today.
3. Both H. and G. are also important for the positions which they hold and their consequent powers and authority. They are friends, and powerful friends, in the enemy's camp, and can be used as such. A contact with G. would be most interesting, but I understand there is little chance of his coming here.
4. Meindl is, I believe, a "bad egg". But here again his position makes him important, and H. is quite convinced that he would actively work for the opposition if given the least encouragement. For this reason, I advised that H. should bring him

~~SECRET~~

out here.

~~SECRET~~

- 3 -

out here. If and when he comes, I do not think that we should see him. Grimm strikes me as the ideal person to deal with him.

5. I did not like Westen, and he struck me as definitely dangerous, owing to his indiscretions (which led to the Swiss arresting him and H. and pushing them over the frontier) and to his "love of the bottle". I see no object in having anything more to do with him, unless he is an indispensable link in H.'s chain of contacts between the Réduit and here.
6. I think there is a danger of regarding H. and W. as representatives of any one political grouping in Austria. The associates whom they listed include representatives of such a variety of political schools that they defy labelling as a group.
7. Pater Schmidt told me that he was going to put W. into contact with his British friends. In these circumstances, I think it would be well if we were to warn the British beforehand of what this whole affair is about and the part we have played in it.

~~SECRET~~

From: Leslie

To: 110

Date: 17.4.45

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

THE REDUIT.

H. states that the Réduit is to be taken very seriously. It is too late now to prevent it, and he is convinced that it will be put into effect. W. on the other hand, believes that in Switzerland we take the Réduit too seriously, arguing that it will contain so many unreliable elements that it can never hold out for long.

Both H. and W. are convinced that the original Nazi plans for the Réduit have been entirely upset by the rapid military developments.

According to H., the original plan was that only "reliable" SS and police troops and party leaders would go into the Réduit. This plan has now been given up. Instead, a strong military Réduit has been planned with many Wehrmacht units as well. Particularly the troops in North Italy and Croatia are to go in, although it is doubtful if the former will ever get there. On the other hand, General Löhner's men from Croatia are fairly certain to get there. Their morale is good. They lack material, but not much will be needed in the mountains. Certain other groups from the Balkans (Mihailowitch) with strong anti-Bolshevist tendencies may also go in. It is, however, difficult at the moment to say who is going in, as this will largely depend on military developments.

In all cases, there is no longer any question of organizing and controlling those who are to go in. Consequently, it is certain that a large number of unreliable elements will get in. Both H. and W. repeatedly stress this, W. adding that the control of reliable elements has become increasingly difficult, as all but the most important archives are now being destroyed by retreating Nazi services.

The rapid military developments are also responsible for lack of preparations within the Réduit, where individual Gauleiters are feverishly trying to organize their respective territories as best they can. Food supplies are not well organized, nor are radio services.

The local populace is being left within the Réduit, although lists of "unreliables" are being drawn up.

Once the Réduit is established, the valleys giving entrance to it will be blown up, so that the forces inside will be completely cut off from the outside world. In such circumstances, and with their families around them, they are likely to resist any attack, unless their fighting morale is undermined by clever propaganda.

From: LESLIE

To: 110

Date: 17.4.45

High Wehrmacht

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

High Wehrmacht officers destined for the Réduit include:

Keitel.
Schöner.
Kesselring.
Model.
Löhr.
Rendulic.

The last two are potential oppositionals.

The Réduit Gauleiters are:

Aigruber	(Upper Austria)
Hofer	(Tirol)
Uiberreiter	(Styria)
Giessler	(Bavaria)
Schael	(Salzburg)
Raener	(Carinthia)

While the first four are radical fanatics, Schael and Raener are much more reasonable.

Considerable defence preparations are noticeable in the Berchtesgaden region. A number of Bavarian Alpine troops have recently arrived in the Salzburg neighborhood.

H. has personally seen King Leopold of the Belgians near Salzburg. When passing through Salzburg on his way to Switzerland, he was informed by the police there that Petain was on his way from Sigmaringen to Salzburg.


H. gives the following boundaries of the Réduit:

Ennstal, Murthal, Obdachersattel, Bleiburg, Kalgenfurt, Villach, Gailthal, Cortina, Bolzano, Stilfserjoch, Pfrunds, Galtür, Swiss frontier, Kempten, Frissen, Tölz, Rosenheim, Salzburg, Wels, Linz.

In his opinion, there is a second inner Réduit up against the Swiss frontier and extending to a line going from the Oetz-taler Alps to the Inn Valley.

W., on the other hand, places the inner Réduit differently, as shown on the attached sketch.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

From: Leslie

Date: 17.4.45

~~SECRET~~

THE BALKANS.

According to H., there exist anti-Bolshevist national groups throughout the Balkans, particularly in:

Albania
Macedonia
Greece
Rumania
Bulgaria
Hungary

H. is quite convinced that the western Allies have made contact with and are even encouraging these groups because of their anti-Bolshevist tendencies. W. tells the same story; thus, he claims to have spoken freely with the head of the American mission attached to Mihailowitch, a man called Mac.Dowell, with whom he claims to have been on the best of terms.

According to H., these groups are still controlled by the Nazis, who organized them. They are well armed, the Germans having handed over their arms to them when withdrawing. However, they lack munitions.

The Nazis still have radio contacts with all of these groups, who will act the moment they receive the word to do so from the Nazis.

To: 110
From: Leslie

Date: 17.4.45

~~SECRET~~

To: 110
From: Leslie
Date: 17.4.45

~~SECRET~~

THE DEFENCE OF VIENNA.

Vienna's defence, according to H., was comparatively weak because the Germans had not anticipated that the Russians would reach it so soon.

When the German offensive in Hungary failed, the Germans were forced to go over from the offensive to the defensive. The resulting chaos was such that there was no possibility of holding the Russian drive to the south.

The German troops employed in Vienna's defence comprised:

1. The 5th Panzer Army.

Theoretically, this included the following five Panzer divisions:

Leibstandarbe Adolf Hitler,
Reichsstandarbe,
Hitlerjugend,
Totenkopf,
Hermann Goering,

In fact, their real strength amounted to a maximum of two divisions.

2. About two and one half divisions, comprising 25,000 men, in Vienna itself.
3. About another two and one half divisions, comprising 25,000 men, in the surroundings of Vienna.

To: 110
From: LESLIE
Date: 17.4.45

~~SECRET~~

To: 10
From: Leslie
Date: 17.4.45

SECRET

~~SECRET~~

WEREWOLF ORGANIZATION.

This organization is based upon the SS Jagddivision Brandenburg and other SS Jagdverbände.

The overall chief of the organization is a man called Prutzmann. The military chief is Scorцени (the man who rescued Mussolini). His second-in-command for south eastern Europe is Major Benes. According to W., Scorцени has under his command about 100,000 SS and "reliable" Wehrmacht men, including Generals, who come from the Aschaffenburg and Thuringia districts. Hitler has ordered Scorцени to take these 100,000 men with him into the Réduit.

The political direction is, presently, under the Foreign Office. It comprises the following persons:

South East Europe.

Croatia)	Neubacher, who is presently
Serbia)	in Kitzbuehl.
Hungary	Vesenmeyer.
Greece)	
Bulgaria)	Altenburg.
Rumania)	

Under the political direction stand the various exiled governments, one member of which is the "Werewolf" man. Thus Horia Sima is the Werewolf man for Rumania, Kovacs for Hungary. Other political leaders include;

Belgium:	Degrelle.
France:	De Brinon.
Holland:	Mussert.
Eastern territories:	Vlassow.

After the Réduit collapses, the SD and AST are to be dissolved. They may, however, carry on underground in occupied Germany with no central headquarters (Schellenberg is head of the SD and AST. In the Foreign Section there are more AST people).

When the SD and AST are dissolved, the underground Werewolf organization will take over. No decision has yet been taken as to where its central headquarters should be located. This is one of the most worrying problems facing the Nazis today.

To: 110
From: LESLIE
Date: 17.4.45

SECRET

According to

~~SECRET~~

- 2 -

According to H., the Werewolf should be taken seriously. It has been systematically organized for the past two years. There are concealed depots of arms, explosives, medicaments, etc. There is also an ample supply of funds.

In H.'s opinion, the future of the organization will depend largely on the political and economic situations prevailing after the war. If these are good, the organization is likely to disrupt quickly. On the other hand, if there is much political unrest and economic discontent, it will thrive.

~~SECRET~~